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CLOUDS IN THE CRYSTAL BALL: PRESIDENTAL EXPECTATIONS AND
THE UNPREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTEES
by
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH* & KIMBERLY A. BEUGER"°
INTRODUCTION
When Justice Byron White announced in March of 1993 that he intended to retire
at the conclusion of the Supreme Court's 1992-93 term,' he created the opportunity for
President Bill Clinton to be the first Democratic president in twenty-six years to select
a nominee for the high court.2 Because " [p]residents recognize that the capacity of their
appointees to help shape the Court's policies is among [the presidents'] majorlegacies, ' '3
Clinton took great care in selecting a nominee. He spent nearly three months considering
potential appointees. Like other presidents, Clinton gave his Supreme Court nomination
"a degree ofpersonal attention that is paralleled only by that given to Cabinet appointments."4
Clinton's selection of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit' immediately elicited predictions from observers
about how Ginsburg's participation would affect the high court's decision making.'
While Clinton expressed the expectation that Ginsburg would "be a force for consensus-
building on the Supreme Court,"7 "[1]iberals fear[ed] that her friendship with conserva-
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Akron; A.B., Harvard University, 1980, M.Sc., University
of Bristol (England), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984; Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1988.
" Teacher, Mesvita High School, Cleveland, Ohio. B.A., University of Findlay, 1990; M.A., University of Akron, 1993.
Linda Greenhouse, White AnnouncesHe'llStepDown From High Court, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 20,1993, at Al.
2 The last Democratic president to nominate a new justice was Lyndon Johnson who appointed Thurgood Marshall
to the Supreme Court in 1967. HENRY J. ABRAMAH, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS To THE SUPREME COURT 292-95 (3d ed. 1992). The one Democratic president to serve in the years
between the Johnson and Clinton presidencies was Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) who had no opportunities to appoint
new justices because there were no deaths or retirements ofjustices during his administration. Id. at 334. By contrast,
all of the Republican presidents who served between Johnson's and Clinton's presidencies made appointments to the
Supreme Court. Richard Nixon made four appointments (Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and
William Rehnquist), Gerald Ford made one appointment (John Paul Stevens), Ronald Reagan made three appoint-
ments (Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy), and George Bush made two appointments
(David Souter and Clarence Thomas). DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 414 (3d ed. 1993).
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 41 (4th ed. 1992).
Id. at 39.
Richard L Berke, Clinton Names Ruth Ginsburg, Advocate for Women, to Court, N.Y TIMES, June 15, 1993, at
Al.
' For example, the Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times declared that "Presumably the center of
gravity will shift with Justice White's retirement .... In [issue] areas in which the Court is often closely divided,
including free speech, religion and abortion, Judge Ginsburg is likely to be substantially more liberal than Justice
White." Linda Greenhouse, The Court's Counterrevolution Comes in Fits and Starts, N.Y TIMES, July 4, 1993, at
El, E5.
Transcript of President's Announcement and Judge Ginsburg's Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at A24.
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tive Justice Antonin Scalia... might move her away from her natural [moderate] allies."s
Others predicted that she "will nudge [the Supreme Court] to re-energize liberal Warren
Court decisions that the Rehnquist regime has all but vanquished."9
Although it remains to be seen which prognosticators, if any, have accurately pre-
dicted Ginsburg's performance, historians will eventually look closely at whether or not
Ginsburg's performance fulfilled the expectations of the person responsible for her
appointment, President Bill Clinton. Presidents always have specific motivations in
selecting Supreme Court nominees. Because presidents cannot control the behavior of
justices on the Court, however, many presidents are ultimately disappointed by the
decisions which their nominees produce. This article will analyze the pitfalls that
presidents face in hoping that their nominees' judicial performance will comport with
presidential expectations. As Justice Ginsburg begins her service on the Rehnquist
Court, President Clinton and other observers should note that Ginsburg's Supreme Court
colleagues provide enlightening examples of the many ways in which justices can
disappoint the presidents who appointed them.
MOTIVATIONS AND DISAPPOINTMENTS
A variety of factors influence the selection of new Supreme Court justices:
"Merit competes with other political considerations like personal and ideological
compatibility, with forces of support or opposition in Congress and the White
House, and with demands for representative appointments on the basis of geogra-
phy, religion, race, gender, and ethnicity."''
Although every Supreme Court appointment involves a unique set ofcircumstances
at the historical moment in which a vacancy arises, presidential motivations in selecting
nominees canbe placed into specific categories. Some categories, such as the president's
perceptions about sharing philosophical values and policy preferences with the nomi-
nee, exert influence overnearly every nomination. Other categories, such as presidential
concems about geographic representativeness on the high court," have been influential
only during specific historical moments.12
Margaret Carlson, The Law According to Ruth, TIME, June 28, 1993, at 38, 40.
' David A. Kaplan & Bob Cohn, A Franfurter, Not a Hot Dog, NEWSWEEK, June 28, 1993, at 29, 29.
0 O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 66.
n Forexample, President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to appoint a Westerner to replace retiring Justice Louis Brandeis
in 1939. The appointee, 'dliam 0. Douglas, had been a Yale law professor in Connecticut, but senators from Western
states endorsed him as one of their own because he had grown up in Yakima, Washington. ABRAHAM, supra note
2, at 225-26.
12 There were apparently no concerns aboutdeveloping a geographical balance on the Supreme Courtin 1992because
President Clinton seriously considered replacing Justice White with Secretary of the Interior and former Arizona
Governor Bruce Babbitt. Richard L. Berke, Babbitt a Candidate for High Court, N.Y. TIMES, June, 4, 1993, at A20;
see also Bob Cohn, Decisions, Decisions, NEWSWEEK, June 21, 1993, at 24, 24-25. If Babbitt had been appointed
instead of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, three of the high court's nine members would have been from a single small state,
Arizona, because Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor were from Arizona.
[Vol. 27:2
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PRESIDENTIAL EXPECTATIONS
Presidents usually place great emphasis on their expectations for how a potential
nominee will affect Supreme Court decisions. As politicians, presidents want to move
public policy in directions that comport with their political values and they recog-
nize that Supreme Court appointments will influence judicial policy making and the
definition of constitutional law. As one scholar has noted, "Because justices serve for
life, they furnish a President with historic opportunities to influence the direction of
national policy well beyond his own term.' 13
Presidents may appoint justices with the intention of advancing specific policy
preferences. For example, Richard Nixon, who won the presidency, in part, by empha-
sizing a "law and order" perspective during his political campaign, selected Warren
Burger to be Chief Justice in 1969 primarily because of Burger's appellate court record
of strident opposition to decisions favoring rights for criminal defendants.14  Other
presidents, both liberals and conservatives, have made their selections based on specific
expectations about how their nominees would decide cases. For example, "President
Franklin Roosevelt's focus in selecting justices was on overturning the Court's rulings
on economic regulation and he chose justices for opposition to or criticism of the con-
servative Supreme Court, their support for his Court-packing plan, and their divergence
from what the 'Establishment Bar' would have chosen."' 5
Unless the president's political party controls the U.S. Senate, excessive emphasis
on a nominee's philosophical orientation may result in the mobilization of effective
political opposition during the confirmation process. A study of the unsuccessful Su-
" O'BREN, supra note 2, at 65.
" Charles M. Lamb, ChiefJustice WarrenE. Burger: A Conservative Chieffor Conservative Times, in THE BURGER
COURT: PoLmcAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 129, 130-32 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpem eds., 1991).
The politics of the late 1960s, Nixon's election in 1968, and the new president's views on criminal
procedure all contributed to Burger's elevation to chief justice.... Given rising crime rates and
several landmark Warren Court decisions expanding the rights of persons accused of crime, "law
and order" grew into a widely debated political issue. The emphasis on criminal justice during the
1968 election year reflected the concerns of a large percentage of Americans and leading political
figures.... During the 1968 campaign, Nixon openly criticized Warren Court policy, stressing that
a principal way to resolve the law and order problem was to appoint Supreme Court justices who
were "strict constructionists" in criminal procedure.
... The president viewed Burger as a so-called strict constructionist who would "apply" the law, not
broadly "legislate" social policy.... He expected Burger to interpret constitutional rights narrowly,
particularly those designed to protect persons accused of crime.
Id.
11 STEPHEN L WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 117 (4th ed. 1993).
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preme Court nominations put forward by Presidents Lyndon Johnson 6 and Richard
Nixon 17 found that:
[t]he major factor leading the Senate to turn down the nominations of Abe
Fortas, Clement F Haynesworth, Jr., and G. Harrold Carswell was the
perceived ideology of the nominees. In all three instances, senators con-
sistently favored oropposed the nominations on the basis of whetheror not
they were in accord with the basic philosophy they believed the nominees
would rely upon in deciding cases .... 18
During the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan was reminded of this lesson when the
Democratically-controlled Senate, by a vote of58 to 42, rejected his nomination of Judge
Robert Bork, an outspoken conservative scholar, as the replacement for retiring centrist
Justice Lewis Powell. 19
Although presidents emphasize nominees' philosophical compatibility in making
appointments,justices frequently surprise and disappoint the presidents who nominated
them. Presidents frequently make inaccurate predictions about how their nominees will
decide cases on the high court. Forexample, Earl Warren's performance as Chief Justice
disappointed President Dwight Eisenhower because Eisenhower expected Warren to be
much more conservative.' Earl Warren had built his reputation as a tough prosecutor
and, as Governor of California, he was an instigator of the shameful World War II era
policy of incarcerating innocent Japanese-American families in concentration camps.2'
On the Supreme Court, however, "Earl Warren was in the process of providing leader-
ship for a libertarian-activist approach to public law and personal rights that went far
beyond the Eisenhower brand of progressive Republicanism. To Eisenhower the new
Warren represented all but a betrayal of older beliefs and understandings. '"2
Presidents may set the stage for their own disappointment when they seek electoral
or other political benefits in selecting an appointee. For example, although Eisenhower
6 President Johnson attempted to elevate Associate Justice Abe Fortas to Chief Justice after Earl Warren infornmed
the President about his impending retirement. See Christopher E. Smith, "What If....": Critical Junctures on the
Road to (In)Equality, 15 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1,1 -12 (1989-90). As a lameduck president, Johnson miscalculated
his ability to push Fortas's elevation through the Senate during an election year. Id.
17 President Nixon made two unsuccessful attempts to appoint Southerners to the Supreme Court in order to cultivate
support from Southern voters. His first nominee, Clement Haynesworth, was hurt by "clear evidence of the nominee's
patent insensitivity to some financial and conflict-of-interest improprieties." ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 15. The
second unsuccessful nominee, G. Ilarrold Carswell, was tarnished by his past support for racial segregation. Id. at 16.
" JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL: Tile ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT IN
UNSUCCESSFUL SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS 1 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
19 DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: TIlE MAKING OF TlE REINQUIST SUPREME COURT 146 (1992).
2o ABRAILAM, supra note 2, at 255.
21 Id.
22 Id.
[Vol. 27:2
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PRESIDENTIAL EXPECTATIONS
predicted, inaccurately as it turned out, that Warren would have a philosophy ofjudicial
restraint, the actual selection of Warren - as opposed to other potential candidates -
was motivated by various political considerations:
[Attorney General Herbert] Brownell was well aware of [the] political debt
to be paid [to Warren by Eisenhower]. For it had been Warren... who was
primarily responsible for swinging all but eight of California's seventy-
member delegation at the Nominating Convention to Eisenhower rather
than to Senator Robert A. Taft at a particularly crucial stage in the jockeying
[involving] the seating of certain contested Southern delegations....
There may have been one other factorinvolved: Warren, the unprecedented
three-term governor of California, although a loyal Republican, had long
been a thorn in side of the partisan California Republican leadership (which
included Vice President Richard M. Nixon ... ) ... [who] would be
delighted to see Warren removed from California politics .... 23
Similarly, Eisenhower appointed William Brennan in 1956 in order to seek electoral
support from Catholic and other urban ethnic voters who traditionally voted for Demo-
crats.' Ultimately, Eisenhower's focus on alternative political motivations contributed
to his disappointment in the liberal decisions of Warren and Brennan and led him to
declare that those two appointments were the greatest mistakes of his presidency.'
PRESIDENTIAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
The Rehnquist Court gained a reputation among scholars as a Court in which "the
conservative bloc has become the most cohesive that it has been in half a century."' With
3 Id. at 255-56.
14 Id. at 265-66.
The president easily concurred ... in the political wisdom of designating, especially in an election
year, a Democrat who also happened to be a Roman Catholic. It might well avoid a "return home"
to the Democratic nominee by Eisenhower Democrats of 1952, buuressing the nonpolitical or
bipartisan atmosphere in which Ike felt more comfortable. Moreover, there had been no one of
Brennan's religious faith on the bench since Justice Murphy's death in 1949; why not "restore" the
time-honored Roman Catholic seat on the Court? The metropolitan East would be pleased indeed!
Id. at 266.
SId. at 266.
[Tihe President who sent [Brennan] to the Court was only slightly less irked by, and disenchanted
with, Brennan's evolving record than with Earl Warren's (whose opinions Brennan joined in most
instances). When Eisenhower was asked later if he had made any mistakes while he had been
President, he replied: "Yes, two, and they are both sitting on the Supreme Court." "Both" referred
to Warren and Brennan.
Id.
21 SHELDON GOLDMAN, CONSTITUInONAL LAW 151 (2d ed. 1991).
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the retirements of Warren Court liberals Wliam Brennan and Thurgood Marshall in
1990 and 1991 respectively, the Court was composed of eight Republican appointees 27
and only one Democratic appointee? Many of the decisions by the lone Democrat,
Byron White, "place[d] him on the unqualifiedly conservative side" of the Supreme
Court during his career.29 Thus, because Republican justices have generally been less
supportive of individuals' claims concerning civil rights and liberties,10 the political
composition of the Court appeared significantly skewed in favor of conservative deci-
sions. However, in spite of the conscious efforts of Republican presidents, such as
Ronald Reagan,3" to fill the Supreme Court with justices who would steer the high court
toward conservative outcomes, the Rehnquist Court has been less uniformly conserva-
tive than many observers expected.32 Despite characterizations of the Rehnquist Court
as a "transformed Court [that] no longer sees itself as the special protector of individual
liberties,"33 the 1992 term revealed that "the Court nonetheless remains sharply divided
in such important areas as religion and civil rights." An examination of the judicial
behaviorof selected members of the Rehnquist Court illustrates why presidential expec-
tations for Supreme Court decision making go unfulfilled, even on a Court that is stacked
with appointees from one political party.
Justice Harry Blackmun: Unpredictable Changes in the Individual Justice
In 1970, after the Senate rejected Richard Nixon's two Southern nominees to the
Supreme Court, Clement Haynesworth and G. Hanrld Carswell, Nixon turned to a life-
2' Harry Blackmun and William Rehnquist were appointed by Republican President Richard Nixon. John Paul
Stevens was appointed by President Gerald Ford. President Ronald Reagan appointed Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy. David Souter and Clarence Thomas were appointed by President George Bush.
" Byron White was appointed by President John F. Kennedy.
29 Daniel C. Kramer, Justice Byron R. White: Good Friend toPolity and Solon, in THE BURGER COURT: POL1TICAL
AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 407, 428 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpem eds., 1991).
" See generally C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of US. Supreme Court Justices:
Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978,75 AM. POL. SCL REV. 355 (1981) (empirical
study indicating that justices' political party affiliations are associated with decisions supporting or opposing civil
liberties claims).
31 See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN To REWRITE THE CON-
STITTON 175-76 (1988).
[Reagan] cannot deliver what [conservatives] want, such as constitutional amendments or legisla-
tion on abortion, school prayer, affirmative action, and busing.
... [However,] [t]he one thing a president can do for these supporters - and this will ultimately
be just as effective on the social issues - is to give them the judges they want.
Id.
32 Robert H. Smith, Justice Souter Joins the Rehnquist Court: An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Voting Patterns,
41 U. KAN. L. REV. 11,12 (1992). A detailed study of the voting patterns ofjustices within the Rehnquist Courtfound
"significant divisions within the blocs of Justices .... [And] significant variations from subject area to subject area."
Id.
13 SAVAGE, supra note 19, at 453.
1 Greenhouse, supra note 6,at El.
[Vol. 27:2
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long friend of Chief Justice Warren Burger, Judge Harry Blackmun of the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Blackmun was a respected, but not widely
known, Midwestern Republican. In nominating Blackmun, Nixon insisted that he was
fulfilling his pledge to nominate a conservative strict constructionist.35 In a memoran-
dum to his assistants, Nixon insisted that "Blackmun is to the right of both Haynsworth
and Carswell on law and order and perhaps slightly to their left, but very slightly to the
left only in the field of civil rights."'
During his early terms on the Court, Blackmun fulfilled Nixon's expectations by
consistently allying himself with conservative Chief Justice Burger.37 As one scholarhas
noted, Blackmun "voted so frequently, and seemingly so predictably, with the Chief
Justice that the press soon dubbed them the 'Minnesota Twins. "' After a few years,
however, Blackmun's decision making patterns changed and he became a relatively
consistent ally of the Court's liberals." By the end of the 1980s, Blackmun was accusing
the Court's conservatives of both forgetting that racial discrimination had ever been a
problem in American society' and "cast[ing] into darkness the hopes and visions of
every woman in this country" by limiting the right of choice for abortions.41 Blackmun's
movement away from judicial conservatism was so substantial that during the Court's
1991 term, Blackmun joined the Court's most liberal justice, John Paul Stevens, in over
seventy-seven percent of nonunanimous cases while agreeing with the Court's most
conservative justices, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, in less than thirty percent
of such cases.41 Scholars have noted that "[iunjurisprudential terms, there can be simply
no doubt that Harry A. Blackmun's judicial odyssey, his transformation from [a] Min-
nesota Twin to [a] firm Brennan-Marshall ally, save in some criminal-justice cases, is
readily demonstrable."43
Laurence Tribe has argued that there is a "myth of the surprised president."" Ac-
cording to Tribe, what appears to be a Supreme Court appointee's failure to fulfill his or
her appointing president's expectations is actually a failure of the president to anticipate
35 MASSARO, supra note 18, at 154.
36 Id.
3 ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 307.
39 Id.
3 See GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 149 ("Blackmun joined the Court as a hard-core conservative but became more
moderate or middle-of-the-road and by the time of the Rehnquist Court was a member of the liberal wing.").
Io Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,662 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("One wonders whether
the majority still believes that race discrimination - or, more accurately, race discrimination against non-whites -
is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.").
41 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,557 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42 Christopher E. Smith & Scott Patrick Johnson, The First-Term Performance of Justice Clarence Thomas, 76
JUDICATURE 172, 174 (1993).
43 ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 310.
" LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THis HONORABLE CouRT 50 (1985).
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all of the issues that will confront the Supreme Court during a specific justice's tenure.'
Thus, if the fulfillment of presidential expectations was limited to an examination of
those issues that specifically motivated the president's appointment decision, it is diffi-
cult to identify any surprised or disappointed presidents. In Tribe's words, "[oin issues
of known import to a President at the time he selects his nominees, a Chief Executive
is much more likely to get his way with the Court.'" With respect to Blackmun, Tribe
argues that "Blackmun... had been picked for [his] tough stances on 'law and order';
Nixon wanted jurists who would indulge the prerogatives of prosecutors and police,
rather than the rights of criminal defendants.' 47 Consistent with Tribe's argument,
Blackmun's reputation as a liberal was not built in the area of criminal justice, in which
he remained relatively conservative, but in areas such as abortion and affirmative action
which had never been considered by the Supreme Court at the time of Nixon's appoint-
ment of Blackmun.4 However, Tribe's argument about the myth of the surprised presi-
dent does not hold when Blackmun's complete tenure is considered. Despite the fact that
Blackmun's liberalization was less pronounced in criminal justice cases (i.e., the issues
that Nixon expected him to decide in a conservative manner), Blackmun's "judicial
transformation manifested itself even on matters of criminal procedure, where his initial
conservatism had lasted longest."49 Forexample, Blackmun ultimately parted company
with his conservative colleagues, and his own conservative past, ° by joining the liberal
justices for many death penalty cases.51 When the Rehnquist Court's conservative
majority disregarded statistical evidence of racial discrimination in Georgia's capital
sentencing,52 a "new" Justice Blackman transpired:
15 Id. at 53-54.
"1 Id. at 54.
47 Id. at 53.
48 Stephen L. Washy, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: Transformation from "Minnesota Twin" to Independent Voice,
in THE BURGER COURT: POLmC AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 66-73 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds.,
1991). Justice Blackmun was appointed in 1971. The Court's monumental abortion case, Roe v. Wade, was decided
in 1973 and the seminal affirmative action decision, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, was not issued
until 1978. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
19 Stephen L. Washy, Harry Andrew Blackmun, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 75, 76 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds.. 1992).
-1 As a judge on the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, Blackmun authored an opinion in 1968 that rejected the use of
statistical evidence to show the existence of improper racial discrimination in capital sentencing for rape cases. See
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (1968), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 997 (1968), and vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). By
contrast, in 1987 Justice Blackmun joined the liberal dissenters in chastising the conservasivejustices for disregarding
such statistical evidence of discrimination in death penalty cases. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,320(1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 For example, Blackmun joined the dissenting opinion of ardent death penalty opponent, William Brennan, when
the Court majority endorsed the execution of teenage offenders. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,382 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
52 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
[Vol. 27:2
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[h]ere... emerged a new Harry Blackmun - one apparently "sensitized
to the vagaries of death penalty litigation."... [Blackmun] asserted in 1987,
' he Court sanctions the execution of a man despite his presentation of
evidence that establishes a constitutionally intolerable level of racially
based discrimination leading to the imposition of his death sentence., 53
Scholars have advanced several theories to explain why Blackmun's decision mak-
ing became more liberal.' After authoring the Supreme Court's controversial decision
that recognized a constitutional right for women to make choices about abortion,5
Blackmun received considerable criticism from scholars and public condemnations
from abortion opponents and conservative politicians.56 Blackmun may have reacted to
the criticism by moving closer to the liberal justices who supported his opinion.5 Al-
ternatively, Blackmun's changed decision making behavior has been attributed to his
resentment for being regarded as an automatic supporter of Chief Justice Burger and for
being assigned by Burger to write relatively few important opinions on behalf of the
Court.5" Blackmun's transformation may also have been generated by his desire to avoid
seeing the Court become too conservative as new Republican appointees gradually
replaced the retiring liberals from the Warren Court era: "When ideology threatened to
move the Court too far to the right, [Blackmun] was stimulated to try to maintain a
centrist philosophy for the Court."59
Whatever the motivation for the liberalization of Blackmun's decisions, his ex-
ample clearly demonstrates that presidents can be disappointed in Supreme Court ap-
pointees when those appointees alter their judicial philosophies while serving on the bench.
" LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE 127 (1992) (quoting
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,345 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
See Wasby, supra note 49, at 71-72.
s See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" See O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 37-38
Even those who favored the ruling sharply criticized Roe for resting on a constitutional right of
privacy. Scholars attacked the legal analysis and reliance on scientific and medical evidence in the
opinion.
Other court watchers critical of Roe... attacked the Court for becoming a 'super legislature'....
For still others, the Court committed a more fundamental sin: it had written the rights of the
unborn out of the Constitution.
Id.
v See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 308 ("As if stung by the attacks, including consistent charges of having created
'ambiguous and uncertain' rights out of whole cloth, Blackmun'sjurisprudence appeared to begin actively to change.").
s Wasby, supra note 48, at 70.
s Id. at 71.
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Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas: Predictable Performance With
Unpredictable Results
Justice Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas were appointed by Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George Bush, respectively, with the intentionofmoving the Supreme Court's
decision making in a conservative direction." Presidents Reagan and Bush also sought
to appeal to specific demographic segments of the electorate with the appointments of
Scalia, an Italian-American,"' and Thomas, an African-American.62 However, these
specific individuals were chosen from among all other potential candidates within their
own (and other) demographic groups because their well-known conservative beliefs
were consistent with the objectives of their respective appointing presidents.63
Justice Scalia and Thomas have fulfilled their appointing presidents' expectations
by staking out, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist," the most consistently conservative
positions among contemporary justices. During the 1992-93 Term, Scalia andThomas
I Although there has regularly been discussion among the press about presidents seeking to maintain a "Catholic
seat" on the Supreme Court, "Justice[] Scalia ... w[as] chosen because of his experience and ideology, not religion."
WASBY, supra note 15, at 116. President Reagan's appointment of Justice Scalia was described by two commentators
in the following terms: "Few in the legal world thought that President Reagan could find anyone to the right of
Rehnquist, but that was an underestimation of the ability of [Reagan's] administration to implement its conservative
wiiI." TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNrrZ, CAPrrOL GAMES CLARENCETHOMAS,ANTA HILL, ANDTHE
STORY OFA SUPREME CouRTNOMINATION 157 (1992). Similarly, Clarence Thomas was selected by George Bush
because of his conservative views and his strong support among political conservatives. Id. at 3. Although some of
Bush's advisors voiced concerns about Thomas's youthfulness (age 43) and relative inexperience (one year as a
federal appellate judge), "[clonservative orthodoxy seemed to be replacing stature as the chief qualification. For
presidents like Reagan and Bush who were determined to bring about a conservative counterrevolution in the federal
courts, youth ensured the judicial longevity of those they chose." Id. at 4-5.
S1 See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 353 ("Finally, the Reagan administration was assuredly not blind to ethnic realities
and the potential political capital generated by naming the first Italian-American to mount the Court.").
I Democratic senators were reluctant to oppose Thomas's nomination because they feared that African-American
voters, especially those in the South who supported Thomas's nomination, might defect to the Republican Party.
Thomas B. Edsall & E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Vote That Split the Liberal Core, WASH. POST NAT'L W'KLY ED., Oct. 2 1-
27,1991, at 12; R.W. Apple, Jr., Senate Confirms Thomas, 52-48, Ending Week ofBitter Battle; Time for Healing,'
Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, OcL 16, 1991, at Al.
I3 See WASBY, supra note 15, at 116 ("Justice Scalia... [was] chosen because of judicial experience and ideology
... although Scalia's religion and ethnic background.. . may have made some difference."); Christopher E. Smith,
Politics and Plausibility: Searching for the Truth About Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas, 19 OHIO N.U.LREV 697,
754 (1993)("Bush nominate Thomas forthe same reasons thatnearly every otherjustice has been, nominated, namely
political reasons.").
6 Prior to Thomas's appointment, for example, Justice Scalia was second only to Chief Justice Rehnquist in his
disinclination to support constitutional rights claims by criminal defendants. Christopher E. Smith, Justice Antonin
Scalia and Criminal Justice Cases, 81 KY. L. J. 187, 193 (1992-93).
' Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley Assessing the Conservatism ofthe Rehnquist Court, 77 JUDICATURE
83, 86 (1993).
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evinced the two lowest levels of support for the claims of individuals in civil rights and
liberties cases. Scalia supported individuals in only twenty-seven percent of such cases
andThomas supported individuals in only thirty percentof suchcases. The twojustices
agreed with each other in ninety-one percent of all cases during the term, the highest
agreement rate among any two justices on the Court. 7 Despite fulfilling presidential
expectations in their individual decision-making behavior, these justices have not ful-
filled, and indeed, have arguably hampered the attainment of Reagan's and Bush's
overriding goals of conservatizing specific judicial policy issues, particularly abortion
and school prayer.
When he was appointed to the Supreme Court, Scalia was viewed by "adoring
conservatives... [as] the savior who will lead them into the judicial promised land of
'strict construction. " Byreplacing the retiringWarrenCourtliberal,ThurgoodMarshall,
Thomas's appointment "symbolized for many the final transformation of the Supreme
Court. While Marshall had been a crusader for minorities and the poor, Thomas was
expected to solidify the new Court's already powerful conservative majority."'69 Despite
being members of a Supreme Court containing only two clear supporters (Blackmun and
Stevens) of a right to choice in abortion 70 and the strict separation of church and state,7
Scalia and Thomas were unable to lead the Court to undo Warren and BurgerCourtprecedents
that conservative Republicans, including Reagan and Bush, found to be objectionable.72
"Id.
Marcia Coyle, The High Court's Center Falls Apart, 15 NAT'L L J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S1, S1.
David Kaplan & Bob Cohn, The Court's Mr Right, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1990, at 62,62.
SAVAGE, supra note 19, at 457.
o After the retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall in 1990 and 1991 respectively, Justice Blackmun and
Stevenls were the only remaining justices who dissented against the Court's approval of state regulation of abortion
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
"' Blackmun and Stevens agreed with each other in nearly eighty percent of First Amendment religion cases from
1981 through 1990, and they agreed less frequently with their more accommodationist colleagues. Christopher E.
Smith & Linda Fry, Vigilance or Accommodation: The Changing Supreme Court and Religious Freedom, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 893, 917 (1991). Their rates of agreements with more conservative justice ranged from forty
percent agreement with Justice Kennedy to sixty-one and fifty-eight percent agreement, respectively, with Justice
O'Connor. Id.
72 See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MO-
MENT 121-34 (1993).Reagan and Bush both publicly criticized the Supreme Court's decisions endorsing a right of
choice for abortion. Reagan "had no trepidation about criticizing the Burger Court's 'activist' stances on abortion,
affirmative action, and other issues. Neither did he make any bones about his strategy of judicial appointment: he
would nominate jurists who shared his values." EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 53, at 18. Reagan was the first
president whose Solicitor General actively sought to have the Supreme Court overtum pro-choice precedents. Id. at
292. Bush also chose his appointees to fit his conservative agenda, id. at 19, and Bush's administration urged the
Supreme Court to eliminate the constitutional right to make choices about abortion. See BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG
& DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 333 (1993).
Reagan was the first president to publicly advocate the elimination of Supreme Court precedents outlawing
organized prayers sponsored by public schools, e.g.. Engel v. Vitale, 370U.S. 421 (1962). See JohnA. MurleySchool
Prayer: Free Exercise of Religion or Establishment of Religion?, in SOCIAL AND REGULATORY POLICY: MORAL
CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 5,33-34 (Raymond Tatalovich & Byron W. Daynes eds., 1988). The Bush
administration also supported a weakening of judicial doctrines supporting the strict separation of church and state.
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Affirm Ban on Prayers in Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1992, at Al.
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The failure of Scalia and Thomas to effectively advance the larger policy objectives
of their appointing presidents stems from the failure of these justices to participate
persuasively in the collegial decision-making processes of the Supreme Court. They
failed to establish the kinds of relationships with their colleagues that would contribute
to success in a collegial environment. It is not sufficient for a justice to espouse the
viewpoints desired by an appointing president if the justice cannot participate effectively
in the high court's group decision-making environment. As one scholar has observed:
No matter how great their isolation from each other, justices have incen-
tives to interact and work together on decisions. The shared goal of seeking
majority approval for an opinion and the general desire to obtain as much
consensus as possible in [a] case often require interaction.On a different
level, justices who feel strongly about cases often attempt to persuade
colleagues to accept their viewpoints, and there may be a good deal of
competition between opposing sides to win votes in... close case[s].73
Because Scalia and Thomas refuse to participate in persuasion and compromise, they
have failed to advance Reagan's and Bush's policy expectations on some issues and even
contributed to the defeat of their own objectives. 4
In 1992, the Supreme Court considered the issue of abortion and the conservative
justices had the opportunity to reverse the Roe v. Wade precedent that was so objection-
able to Reagan, Bush, and other political conservatives. 75 The case arose at a time when
only Justice Blackmun remained on the Court from among the seven original members
of the Roe majority. In a surprising decision, Reagan- and Bush- appointees Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter co-authored an opinion supported by Blackmun and Stevens that
reaffirmed Roe v. Wade and the existence of a fundamental right of choice concerning
abortion.76 The decision was especially surprising because Justice Kennedy had been
among the critics of Roe v. Wade in a 1989 case in which he joined an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, a dissenter in the original Roe case, that clearly indicated that several
justices, including Kennedy, believed that Roe should be overruled.' Moreover, Justice
" BAUM, supra note 3, at 159.
74 SMITH, supra note72, at 121-34.
7' CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 72, at 169, 191.
76 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
' Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 492 U.S. 490, 517-21 (1989).
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O'Connor, who had criticized both the reasoning 8 and judicial activism79 underlying
Roe as early as 1983, suddenly made it clear that she wanted to preserve the right-to-
choice precedent.80 The co-authored opinion placed great emphasis on the need to
maintain stare decisis in order to protect the high court's image and legitimacy8 t by
avoiding the perception that an alteration of Roe by the Rehnquist Court was based
merely on political changes in the Court's composition. 2 These were arguments
that Kennedy and O'Connor had not raised when they participated in the criticism
of Roe in earlier abortion decisions.13
In another 1992 case, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter again joined Blackmun and
Stevens to create a five-member majority that preserved and expanded Warren Court
decisions opposing official sponsorship of religious activities in public schools." Justice
Kennedy surprised observers 5 by authoring the majority opinion which barred the
recitation of prayers by clergy at public school graduations. Kennedy's actions were
surprising because he had previously joined opinions criticizing the Court's separationist
Establishment Clause jurisprudence 6 and he had written an opinion that accused the
" In a case rejecting the City of Akron's abortion regulations Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion criicized Roe's
reliance on the current state of medical technology in using a trimester framework to determine the nature and timing
of women's right of choice during pregnancy. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,
454-59 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She called the trimester framework in Blackmun's Roe opinion "a com-
pletely unworkable method of accommodating the conflicting personal rights and compelling state interests that are
involved in the abortion context." Id. at 454.
' With respect to the Supreme Court's involvement in the abortion issue, O'Connor wrote:
Irrespective of what we may believe is wise or prudent policy in this difficult area, "the Consti-
tution does not constitute us as 'Platonic Guardians' nor does it vest in this Court the authority to
strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy, 'wisdom,' or
common sense."
Id. at 453 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
' CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 72, at 337-39
SI Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816 ("A decision [overturning Roe] would [be] at the cost of both
profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law.").
52 According to the co-authored opinion:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the
terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and
political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.
Id. at 2814.
Smith, supra note 72, at 88-102
u Leev. Weisman, 112S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
See Christopher E. Smith, Supreme Court Surprise: Justice Anthony Kennedy's Move Toward Moderation, 45
OKLA. L. REV. 459,468-71 (1992).
" See Smith & Fry, supra note 71, at 927-28.
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Supreme Court of discriminating against Christians by not permitting the government
to publicly support Christian holidays.8 7
Why did Kennedy and O'Connor part company with their usual allies among the
Court's conservatives and thereby provide the necessary votes to defeattheir appointing
president's (Reagan) preferred policies? One significant factor that appeared to drive
Kennedy and O'Connor away from their erstwhile allies was the confrontational style
and combative judicial behavior of Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Justice Scalia developed a reputation as a justice who would regularly employ
sarcastic, strident language to condemn any justice, friend or foe, who disagreed with
him,' and Justice Thomas appears to emulate Scalia's style.89 As one observer noted,
"Thomas can write in language that brings to mind Scalia's occasional let's-you-and-
me-scrap tone."90 In the 1989 abortion case in which the conservatives were poised to
overtum Roe if they could gain O'Connor's support, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
I County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). In a case concerning the permissibility of religions holiday displays in public
buildings, Kennedy wrote:
I am quite certain that ["the reasonable person"] will take away a salient message from our
holding in [this] case[]: the Supreme Court of the United States has concluded that the First
Amendment creates classes of religions based on the relative number of adherents. Those religions
enjoying the largest following must be consigned to the status of least-favored faiths so as to avoid
[the] risk of offending members of minority religions.
Id. at 677.
See also Smith & Fry, supra note 71, at 940 ("The implicit message in this statement, namely that 'we are the
majority, therefore we must have our way,' epitomizes an orientation toward religious freedom that lacks sensitivity
to the concerns and rights of members of religious minorities.").
U See ChristopherE. SmithJJusticeAntonin Scalia and the Istitutions ofAmerican Government, 25 WAKE FOREST
L REV. 783 (1990).
As one study noted:
Thomas appeared to be most like Scalia in his willingness to criticize other justices while em-
ploying less diplomacy than most justices usually use in their opinions.... Scalia is well-known
for his strident opinions that roundly condemn his colleagues.... For example, in one case in which
Thomas and Scalia were lone dissenters against the majority's finding of a constitutional violation
when corrections officials beat a prisoner, Thomas wrote, with a touch of sarcasm, that "the Eighth
Amendment is not.., a National Code of Prison Regulation" as he criticized the majority for
behaving as if the Constitution can cure all social ills. [Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1010
(1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)]. In another dissent, Thomas criticized the majority's construction
of a statute defining the crime of extortion:
As serious as the Court's disregard for history is its disregard for well-established
principles of statutory construction.... If the Court makes up this version of the
crime [of extortion] today, who is to say what version it will make up tomorrow
when confronted with the next perceived rascal? [Evans v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 1881, 1899, 1904 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)].
Smith & Johnson, supra note 42, at 177 (footnotes omitted).
91 Thomas Sancton, Judging Thomas, TIME, July 13, 1992, at 30.
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Justices White and Kennedy, attempted to patiently cultivate O'Connor's support.9 1
Meanwhile Scalia undercut their efforts by condemning O'Connor for not immediately
joining the conservative initiative.9 Scalia's concurring opinion was a quintessential
example of his failure to adhere to the Court's usual traditions ofdiplomatic opinions and
strategic interactions in orderto cultivate the support ofcolleagues. WhileRehnquist and
the other conservatives were building a bridge between themselves and O'Connor by
laying the groundwork forO'Connortojoin their open opposition toRoe in a future case,
Scalia was bulldozing their structure by attacking O'Connor. Could O'Connor be
91 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Because Justice O'Connor was not yet willing
to provide the fifth vote necessary for reversal of Roe, Chief Justice Relmquist, joined by Justices White and Kennedy,
claimed to agree that "[t]his case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe," which, unlike this
case concerning a Missouri regulatory statute, concerned a Texas statute that criminalized abortions. Id. at 521. Thus
Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy admitted that they were "modify[ing] and narrow[ing] Roe," but leaving the land-
mark precedent in place. Id. Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy would not take the risk of advocating outright reversal
of Roe until they were sure of O'Connor's support for fear that asserting too strong a position against abortion might
push O'Connor to join the liberals in setting yet another precedent endorsing Roe. Rehnquist and his allies claimed
to agree with O'Connor's assertion thatRoe did notneed to be reexamined in this case, yetthey also sought topersuade
O'Connor of Roe's fatal flaws by detailing their reasons why the Roe opinion was inconsistent with the Constitution:
[TIhe rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general
terms, as ours is, and usually speaking in general principles, as ours does. The key elements of the
Roe framework - trimesters and viability - are not found in the text of the Constitution or in any
place else one would expect to find a constitutional principle. Since the bounds of the inquiry are
essentially indeterminate, the result has been a web of legal rules that have become increasingly
intricate, resembling a code or regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine.
Id. at 518.
In their strategic action of seeking to persuade O'Connor while indicating a willingness to wait for her to make a
decision, Rehnquist, White, and Scalia sought to cultivate her support for any subsequent case that would challenge
Roe more directly.
92 Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part in concurring in judgment). While Rehnquist, with the support of White
and Kennedy, strategically crafted his opinion to express opposition to Roe while endeavoring to gain O'Connor's
supportin the future, Scalia employed his characteristic stridency toattack his conservative allies, especially O'Connor,
for being unwilling to wipe away the Roe precedent once and for all. In his concurring opinion, Scalia used all of his
strongest techniques, including sarcasm, personal attacks, and dire warnings of impending catastrophe, to condemn
his colleagues. Scalia sarcastically derided Rehnquist's majority opinion:
The outcome of today's case will doubtless be heralded as a triumph of judicial statesmanship. It
is notthat, unless itis statesmanlike needlessly to prolong this Court's self-awarded sovereignty over
a field where it has little proper business since the answers to most of the cruel questions posed are
political and not juridical.
Id.
Scalia directed a special attack at O'Connor for failing to come out against Roe. In a strong statement, Scalia
declared that "Justice O'Connor's assertion that a 'fundamental rule of judicial restraint' requires us to avoid recon-
sideringRoe, cannot betaken seriously"Id. (emphasis added). Supreme Courtjustices areaccustomed to disagreeing
strongly with each other's reasoning. However, words that imply such a complete and belittling rejection of a
colleague's opinion are out of step with the usual strategic diplomacy employed by justices to cultivate support from
each other. Scalia proceeded to devote fully half of his opinion to attacking O'Connor for authoring and joining
opinions in other comparable situations that reexamined precedents despite not facing direct challenges to those
precedents. Id. The opinion made it very clearthat one of Scalia's primarypurposes was toimplicitly label O'Connor
as a "hypocrite" for refusing to tackle the abortion issue in circumstances in which she had previously addressed
directly a variety of other controversial issues. See id.
Fall.19931
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expected to provide the crucial fifth vote against Roe in a subsequent case when she had
endured a strident and personal attack from Scalia? O'Connor might have felt that she
risked the appearance of being pounded into submission if she were to agree with Scalia
in a later case. Moreover, O'Connor had reason to be annoyed with other aspects of
Scalia's behavior,93 most notably because Scalia, as well as Thomas, were widely re-
ported in the news media as deriding O'Connor within the Court for making decisions
as if she were a "politician" rather than a "judge." Because O'Connor, in turn, has
responded to her conservative antagonists by accusing them of rushing too quickly in an
effort to undo established precedents,9 it is not surprising that she reacted against Scalia's
and Thomas's combative behavior by acting to preserve the Roe precedent."
It is less clear that Justice Kennedy was alienated by Scalia'sjudicial style. Although
there were press reports indicating that Kennedy was offended by Scalia's attacks,97
91 In a candid interview, Justice Blackmun described Scalia's behavior and the way in which he antagonized O'Connor.
[Justice Scalia] is and always will be the professor at work.... He asks far too many questions, and
he takes over the whole argument of the counsel, he will argue with counsel.... Even [Justice
O'Connor], who asks a lot of questions, a couple of times gets exasperated when [Scalia] interrupts
her line of inquiry and goes off on his own. She throws her pencil down and [says,] "umh, uth."
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Blackmun Provides a Peek at the People Under Those Robes, N.Y TIMES, July 25, 1988, at B6.
The Supreme Court correspondent for the Los Angeles Times also reported that O'Connor was irritated by
Scalia's behavior at oral argument:
On a bench lined with solemn gray figures who often sat as silently as pigeons on a railing, Scalia
stood out like a talking parrot....
... Scalia's show did not always play well with the other justices. Several said they wished he
would be quiet for a change. On occasion, Byron White would glare down the bench with a look
that suggested he would like to put the newestjustice into a headlock if it would shut him up. Sandra
O'Connor would harnmmph slightly when [Scalia] interrupted one of her questions.
SAVAGE, supra note 19, at 119.
" Paul M. Barrett, On the Right: Thomas Is Emerging As Strong Conservative Out to Prove Himself, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 27, 1993, at A1, A6. According to a report in the Wall Street Journal:
[Tihere is an undercurrent of tension between [Thomas] and ... O'Connor, people familiar with the
workings of the [Clourt say, although it has surfaced publicly only in the justices' opinions.
Justice Thomas has come to agree with Justice Scalia's view, shared with conservative clerks and
others, that jurists who seek compromise, rather than the single "right" answer in a case, are
"politicians" masquerading in black robes.
Justice O'Connor, a proponent of splitting differences and moving cautiously, gets tagged with
this pejorative most often in private conversation at the high court.
Id.
'7 See id. at A6 C" [O'Connor] has accused Justice Thomas in her opinions of misconstruing high court precedent in
his hurry to remake constitutional law.").
96 O'Connor had never stated a clear position on Roe prior to 1992, so some might argue that she did not react to
Scalia in finally stating her views. However, she avoided stating a view until directly confronted with the issue after
Scalia had attacked her.
" See Paul M. Barrett, Independent Justice: David Souter Emerges As Reflective Moderate on the Supreme Court,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1993, at Al, AI-A6 ("'There is no question that [Souter] doesn't take [criticism from Justice
Scalia] as personally as Kennedy and O'Connor,' says a lawyer who clerked last term for another justice.").
[Vol. 27:2
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Kennedy had consistently joined Scalia in deciding many cases during previous terms.98
During the 1990-91 Term, for example, Kennedy and Scalia agreed with each other in
78 percent of all nonunanimous cases, a high agreement level that was exceeded only
by Kennedy's 83 percent agreement rate with Justice Souter and Souter's 89 percent
agreement rate with O'Connor.99 What, then, was the difference for Justice Kennedy
between the 1990 Term, when he manifested his usual consistent conservatism, and the
1991 Term, in which he provided decisive fifth votes to thwart conservatives' expecta-
tions about altering abortion and prayer in school?(D The most obvious difference
between the two terms was the presence on the Supreme Court of JusticeThomas. There
is reason to believe thatThomas alienated some of his colleagues during his controversial
confirmation process.10' According to journalists, Thomas "infuriated some, if not all,
of thejustices" by staging a large celebration and insisting that he be sworn in as a Justice
on the day after the funeral for Chief Justice Rehnquist's wife."'2 Thomas's appearance
on the cover of a People magazine issue in which his wife described the confirmation
hearings as "spiritual warfare" and "[g]ood versus evil"'13 was "according to Court
insiders.... greeted with abject horror in the chambers of many of the justices."'"
Moreover, according to a national news magazine, "two conservative justices who
watched the [Thomas confirmation] hearings told their clerks that they thought [Justice]
Thomas lied to the Judiciary Committee."" 5 Thus, Kennedy, as well as O'Connor and
Souter, may have sought to disassociate themselves from a justice who, despite being a
fellow Republican appointee ofa conservative president, had nothandled effectively and
gracefully the plausible sexual harassment charges that turned his nomination into a
controversial political battleY°6
As indicated by the consequences of the judicial behavior of Justices Scalia and
Thomas, presidential expectations may remain unfulfilled even if their appointees de-
cide cases in the manner that the president desires. If the appointees are not respected
" Scott P. Johnson& Christopher E. Smith, David Sourer's First Term on the Supreme Court: The Impact ofa New
Justice, 75 JUDICATuRE 238,239 (1992).
9 Id.
IOD Smith, supra note 85, at 465-71.
Im Id. at 473-76.
'm PHELPS & WINTERNTrZ, supra note 60, at xv.
1W Virginia Lamp Thomas, Breaking Silence, PEOPLE, Nov. 11, 1991, at 108, 111.
' Karen O'Connor, The Effects of the Thomas Appointment to the Supreme Court, 25 PS: POL. SCI. & POL.
492, 495 (1992).
" David A. Kaplan et aL An Uncomfortable Seat, NEwswEEK, Oct. 28, 1991, at 31,31.
'0 The charges against Thomas appear to be quite plausible because none of Thomas's supporters could substantiate
any evil motives on the pan of his accuser, ProfessorAnita Hill. See Smith, supra note 63 at 714-46. Moreover, Hill's
four unconnected corroborating witnesses presented uncontradicted testimony that she had told them aboutThomas's
harassment years before anyone could have predicted that Thomas would be nominated to the nation's highest court.
Id. at 722. Thus there is no evidence that Hill manufactured her charges against Thomas. Id. at 727.
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by their colleagues or if they fail to work effectively within the collegial, group decision-
making processes of the Supreme Court, presidents and their political allies may be
disappointed to see that outspoken justices harm the attainment of their own preferred
outcomes by alienating other justices.
Justice David Souter: Judicial Conservatism That Differs From Political Conservatism
President Bush appointed Judge David Souterto replace Warren Court liberal William
Brennan because he wanted a conservative jurist on the Supreme Court whose nomina-
tion would not produce a bruising confirmation battle in the Senate.107 As one scholar
observed about Souter:
It was abundantly clear, however, that based on his five years of service on
the New Hampshire Superior Court and seven on [the state's] Supreme
Court, that here was a jurist firmly committed to Bush's desire for a strict
constnictionist, a judicial restraintist, dedicated to legal and constitutional
precedent and history. 108
During Souter's first term on the high court, Bush's desire for an additional, dependable
conservative vote appeared to be fulfilled.""° Souter became a member of a consistent
conservative voting bloc by voting together with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, O'Connor, and White in more than seventy percent of nonunanimous
cases.110 He also cast the decisive fifth vote in eleven conservative five-to-four decisions
that would have been decided the other way if his predecessor, Justice Brennan, had
remained on the Court.'ll These cases included seven criminal justice issues 12 and two First
See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 366.
Thepresident's decision to select Judge Souter- ajudgehe had never met or spoken with until then
- was based predominantly on the chief executive's desire to finger a conservative judge with no
controversial written opinions (especially on the emotional abortion issue) that would trigger sus-
tained ideological conflict on the eve of the 1990 midterm elections.
Id.
106 Id. at 367.
9 Johnson & Smith, supra note 98 at 239-42.
1o Id. at 239.
"' Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Newcomer on the High Court: Justice Souter and the Supreme Court's
1990 Term, 37 S.D. L REV. 21, 39-41 (1992).
'2 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (no Eighth Amendment proportionality problem with a mandatory
life sentence without parole for possession of a specified amount of cocaine); Peretz v. United States, I llS. Ct. 2661
(1991) (U.S. magistrate judges permitted to conduct voir dire for felony juries despite lack of explicit statutory
authority); Schad v. Arizona, I I IS. Ct. 2491 (1991) (no constitutional violation in judge's failure to instruct jury on
lesserincluded offenses in capital case); Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (subjective standard for determining
unconstitutional conditions of confinement in prisons); Mu'min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (no right to fair
trial violation when judge refused to question jurors about the contents of news reports to which they had been
exposed); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991) (arrestees may be held for forty-eight hours
before charges or evidence are presented against them); Arizona v. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (coerced
confessions may be regarded as "harmless error").
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Amendment issues"' that the divided Court decided in favor of the government rather than
in favor of the individual claimants who asserted violations of their constitutional rights.
In his second term, however, Souter disappointed Bush and other conservatives by
joining Kennedy, O'Connor, Blackmun, and Stevens to thwart the President's desire for
the removal of judicial precedents that established abortion rights1t4 and barred public
schools from sponsoring religious activities.1 I Unlike Justices Kennedy and O'Connor,
Souter appears unaffected by the confrontational styles of Justices Scalia andThomas,"6
and the news media have noted "Justice Souter's ability to confront Justice Scalia
without rancor."1 7 Thus Souter's failure to fulfill his appointing president's expec-
tations stems from some source other than alienation from the stridency of his more
conservative colleagues.
A primary source of difficulty for presidents seeking to appoint like-minded justices
is that political terminology, especially the words "conservative" and "liberal", are not
necessarily applicable in auniform manner when applied tojudges. Forexample, Justice
Scalia and Souter are both "conservative" in the sense that, unlike Justices William
Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, William 0. Douglas, and other Warren Court liberal
stalwarts, they are generally disinclined to favor individuals' claims of asserted consti-
tutional rights over the policy determinations of officials in the legislative and executive
branches of government. This disinclination is reflected in the fact during the 1990 and
1991 terms, Scalia's and Souter's average support level for the claims of individuals in
civil rights and liberties was twenty eight percent and forty-two percent, respectively,
while the Court's more liberal justices had much higher percentages (i.e., Blackmun,
sixty-eight percent; Stevens, seventy-seven percent)."' However, Scalia and Souter
frequently diverge in the application of their respective brands of conservatism to Su-
preme Court cases because Scalia often seeks to advance conservative outcomes while
'" Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (state can ban nude dancingin bars despitethe fact that such dancing
is acknowledged to be a form of artistic expression); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. C. 1759 (1991) (president can alter
interpretation of government regulations in order to bar doctors in federal funded clinics from providing patients with
information about abortion).
"' See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. C. 2791 (1992).
"S See Lee v. Weisman, 112S.Ct. 2649 (1992).
116 See Jeffrey Rosen, Poetic Justice, THE NEW REPUBuC, March 8, 1993, at 25,26.
Unlike Sandra Day O'Connor, who can get rattled by Scalia's bullying, Souter is amused by what
he calls "Nino blowing off steam." Last June, for example, when Scalia ranted at Souter for
following two inconsistent decisions by John Marshall, Souter replied, deadpan: "The dissent
accuses us of repeating what it announces as Chief Justice Marshall's misunderstanding... of his
own previous opinion. We are honored."
Id.
"S Barrett, supra note 97, atAl.
"' Smith & Hensley, supra note 65, at 86.
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Souter seeks to restrain his judicial role by respecting case precedents, including liberal
precedents. Scalia has stated clearly that he will not abide by liberal precedents with
which he disagrees,1 9 but Souter's conservatism leads him to preserve the Court's image
and legitimacy as ajudicial institution, even if he may not personally wish to endorse a
particular outcome. Scalia attacks liberal precedents if he finds them to be objectionable.
By contrast, Souter may uphold such precedents if he believes the Court's image will be
tarnished by changing precedents too rapidly. Onthe abortion issue, for example, Souter
was the chief architect of the co-authored opinion emphasizing the importance of stare
decisis because he reportedly believed that "[flor the [C]ourt to reverse itself on
such a contentious issue would encourage the impression of it as moved by raw
politics, not reason."'12
The differing approaches of conservative Justices Scalia and Souter reflect empha-
ses on alternative aspects of the concept ofjudicial restraint. One scholar has identified
six dimensions of the concepts ofjudicial activism and restrain t. 2 Justice Scalia is "one
of the most vocal advocates of judicial restraint among the justices in the emerging
conservative majority,"'" yet Scalia places much less emphasis than does Souter on the
"Interpretive Stability" dimension ofjudicial restraint. They are both conservatives, but
they emphasize different priorities within their conservativejudicial philosophies. Presi-
dent Bush may have hoped that he was appointing another Scalia when he saw the
conservative trends in Souter's state court judicial decision making. However, Souter
has felt it necessary on the U.S. Supreme Court to emphasize "Interpretive Stability," a
component missing from Scalia's brand of conservatism. Thus Souter has disappointed
"' See, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 409 U.S. 805,825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I would think it a violation
of my oath to adhere to what I consider a plainly unjustified intrusion upon the democratic process in order that the
Court might save face.").
11 Barrett, supra note 97, at A6.
121 See Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 236,239 (1983).
(1) Majoritarianism - the degree to which policies adopted through democratic processes are
judicially negated.
(2) Interpretive Stability - the degree to which earlier court decisions, doctrines, orinterpreta-
tions are altered.
(3) Interpretive Fidelity -the degree to which constitutional provisions are interpreted contrary
to the clear intentions of their drafters or the clear implications of the language used.
(4) Substance/Democratic Process Distinction -- the degree to which judicial decisions make
substantive policy rather than affect the preservation of democratic political processes.
(5) Specificity of Policy - the degree to which a judicial decision establishes policy itself as
opposed to leaving discretion to other agencies or individuals.
(6)Availability of an Alternate Policymaker- the degree to which ajudicial decision supersedes
serious consideration of the same problem by governmental agencies.
Id.
" Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Emerging Majority: Restraining the High Court Or Transforming
Its Role?, 24 AKRON L. REV. 393, 399 (1990).
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political conservatives,"2 including President Bush, because his judicial conservatism
differs from that of Scalia, Thomas and Rehnquist, the Court's most active proponents
of achieving conservative outcomes in nearly every case.
Souter's example illustrates the risk that presidents may misperceive value differ-
ences that exist between themselves and theirgenerally like-minded nominees. Becausejustices may constrain their personal values by seeking to fulfill their vision of the
appropriate role for a judicial officer," their apparent liberalism or conservatism may
differ from that of the appointing president and thereby ultimately lead the president's
expectations on specific issues to remain unfulfilled.
CONCLUSION
Justice Ginsburg and President Clinton's Expectations
Like other presidents, Clinton had multiple purposes when he appointed Judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court in 1993. One dominant consideration was "his
need for a nominee who was risk-free, one who would not only sail smoothly through
the Senate but also might eclipse some of his most recent embarrassments, reconfirm his
move to the political center and give new momentum to his Administration."' t In
addition, Clinton had to be concemed about maintaining support from his liberal con-
stituents in the Democratic Party by appointing someone who would support the right
of choice for abortion and who would generally provide much greater support for the
protection of individuals' constitutional rights than that provided by the predominantly
Republican members of the Rehnquist Court.a2 In Ginsburg, Clinton found a nominee
with established liberal credentials from heryears as the nation's foremostlegal advocate
of equal rights for women when she argued six seminal gender discrimination cases
' See Barrett, supra note 97, at Al.
The White House assured the GOP hard right that David Souter would be "a home run."
The Bush Administration was "miserably inaccurate," complains Thomas Jipping, vice president
of the Free Congress Foundation, which coordinated support for the nomination among conserva-
tive groups. He says that Justice Souter has been "horrible in some of the real fundamental areas."
Exhibit A was last June's abortion ruling....
Id.
12 See CHRISTOPHER .SMrT, COURTS, PoLrTcs, AND TIE JUDICIAL PRocEss 144 (1993) ("[J]udges'role concep-
tions limit the expression of what judges want to do (i.e., their policy pteferences) because judges also seek to do what they
think they ouht t do according to their beliefs about the proper role and behavior forjudicial officers.").
"2 Thomas L Friedman, The 11th Hour Scramble, N.Y. TIMFS, June 15, 1993, at Al, A23.
t2 Other than Ginsburg, all of the other eight justices on the Rehnquist Court are Republicans appointed by
Republican presidents.
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before the Supreme Court in the early 1970s.127 However, Ginsburg's record as a liberal
attorney posed little risk of concerted opposition by Republican senators and conserva-
tive interest groups because as a judge, Ginsburg "has occasionally disappointed some
of her former liberal allies in the liberal advocacy groups. In her 13 years on the appeals
court, she has... often gone out of her way to mediate between the court's waning liberal
and conservative factions."'"
Did Clinton find the perfect appointee who would avoid controversy while fulfilling
his expectations in decision making? With respect to avoiding controversy, by winning
easy confirmation, Ginsburg proved that her image as a thoughtful, moderate judge
defused any potential conservative opposition.2 9 Moreover, as the lone Democrat
joining a Supreme Court loaded with Republican appointees from conservative presi-
dents, her presence will do little to make significant immediate changes in the balance
of power and the trends in decision making. Thus she was confirmed by the Senate in
an impressive 96-to-3 vote."3
With respect to Ginsburg's decision making as a justice, obviously it remains to be
seen whether her decisions will comport with Clinton's expectations. In comparing her
to other Rehnquist Court justices who have disappointed their appointing presidents,
there is little reason to predict that she will change her views, like Justice Blackmun, or
that she will alienate fellow justices, like Justices Scalia and Thomas. During her
confirmation hearings, although she deftly avoided answering many questions concern-
ing ongoing controversies, such as homosexuals' rights and the death penalty,' her
statements condemning discrimination' 32 and supporting a right of choice for abortion 33
seemed consistent with her long-standing viewpoints from her years as a lawyer, law
professor, and appellate judge. Moreover, because she spent many years as a constitu-
tional law professor, she seemed less likely than some other justices to face issues on the
Supreme Court which either she had never encountered before or which were beyond
the scope of the judicial philosophy she developed through years of advocacy, teaching,
writing, and judging. Thus there is no special basis for anticipating that she will adopt
a new judicial outlook as Justice Blackmun did.
'x See Neil A. Lewis, Rejected as Clerk, Chosen as a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at Al, A23.
12B Id.
2 See Walter Goodman, A Judicious TV Image with a Flairfor Detail, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1993, at B1, B4.
1U0 Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 96-3, Easily Affirms Judge Ginsburg as Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at B8.
"I Neil A. Lewis, Ginsburg Deflects Pressure to Talk on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1993, at Al.
132 See Excerpts From Senate Hearings on Ginsburg Supreme Court Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1993, atA8
("I think rank discrimination for any reason - hair color, eye color, you name it - rank discrimination is un-
American for whatever reason. If you have a classification, there has to be a reason .... ").
'3 Neil A. Lewis, Ginsburg Embraces Right of a Woman to Have Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1993, at Al.
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Similarly, there is little basis forexpectingherjudicial style to subvert hereffective-
nessinthemannerofJustices Scalia andThomas. President Clinton appointed Ginsburg,
in part, because her appellate court performance demonstrated that she could work very
effectively within collegial, group decision-making process. Clinton nominated her
with the explicitly-stated expectation that "she will be... a force for consensus-building
on the Supreme Court, just as she has been on the Court of Appeals, so that our judges
can become an instrument of our common unity in the expression of their fidelity to the
Constitution."'" Ginsburg's testimony seemed to confirm that she placed a high value
on collegiality and may, in fact, regard collegiality within the Court as sometimes more
important than the substantive outcome of a case. 35 Thus she seems likely to be the
antithesis of Justices Scalia and Thomas, and therefore she should work actively to
develop opinions that will appeal to a majority of justices.
The one way in which Ginsburg's Supreme Court performance may differ from
Clinton's expectations is in her belief in a restrained judicial role; a belief that may lead
her to endorse conservative outcomes that are unpopular with liberal Democrats who
supported her nomination. Just as Justice Souter's performance has been more liberal
than many Republicans had hoped, Justice Ginsburg's performance may deviate from
the expectations ofherappointing president. During herconfirmationhearings, Ginsburg
disclaimed any judicial monopoly over guardianship of the Constitution"M and she
13, Transcript of President's Announcement and Judge Ginsburg's Remarks, supra note 7, at A24.
'a See Lewis, supra note 133, atAll.
In her slow cadence, Judge Ginsburg also offered a glimpse into her emphasis on the importance
of judges' going along with their colleagues' views. She suggested that unanimity on a court can
sometimes be nearly as important as the merits of a case.
... Judge Ginsburg said, "This is an area where style and substance meet." She said she believed
that judges should avoid taking zealous positions and should avoid writing overwrought opinions
criticizing their colleagues. "You should say to yourself 'Is this conflict really needed?' she said.
She also suggested that when confronted with disagreement from a fellow judge, one should "pause
and rethink your own views."
Judge Ginsburg's interest in collegiality was a factor that made her an attractive Supreme Court
candidate. But her tendency to elevate collegiality to a substantive issue has also eamed her some
criticism from lawyers who have said that courtesy may be a fine value but that a judge should not
abandon or tailor her beliefs to please colleagues. One comment that Judge Ginsburg made today
is likely to bolster those critics. She said that ajudge who is inclined to disagree might stop and think:
"Is this a case where it really doesn't matter which way the law goes as long as it's clear?"
Id.
1 See Excerpts From Senate Hearings on Ginsburg Nomination to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1993,
at C26, C27.
Supreme Court justices are guardians of the great charterthat has served as ournation's fundamental
instrument ofgovernment forover200years.... But the justices do not guard constitutional rights
alone; courts share that profound responsibility with Congress, the President, the states, and the
people. The constant realization of a more perfect union, the Constitution's aspiration, requires the
widest, broadest, deepest participation on matters of government and government policy.
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explicitly acknowledged that courts' have a limited capacity to effectively make and
enforce public policy.137 Ginsburg expressed fears that legal victories may be fleeting
if courts move too fast and too far ahead of the other institutions in society." Because
commentators who analyzed her confirmation hearing testimony concluded that
"Ginsburg's approach [to judging] should enable her to fit comfortably on the current
Court, near the center now inhabited by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, David Souter,
and less consistently, Anthony M. Kennedy," 139 it appears likely that Ginsburg may be
more conservative on some issues than President Clinton realizes.
It is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy whether and to what extent
a Supreme Court justice will fulfill the expectations of his or her appointing president.
As illustrated by the examples of justices serving on the Rehnquist Court, unfulfilled
presidential expectations can be generated by a variety of causes. Although presidents
cannot control the performance of their appointees to the Supreme Court, they can learn
from the experiences of their predecessors when they consider potential nominees. For
example, while any justice may embark on a Blackmun-esque voyage of self-discovery
and transformation, presidents may diminish the risk of unexpected changes injudicial
decision making by appointing new justices who possess broad experience in facing the
complex issues of a heterogenous society rather than individuals from narrow profes-
sional backgrounds and limited personal experiences. Judicial officers who lack con-
crete exposure to and understanding of societal problems may either change unexpect-
edly or produce opinions that are disconnected from the human society that is affected
by judicial decisions."4 Similarly, the lesson offered by the judicial performances of
Justices Scalia and Thomas is that a president must recognize not only the human society
from which ajustice is drawn and which will be affected by judicial decisions, but also
the human environment within the high court in which nine individuals interact with
each other (or fail to do so) in shaping opinions. Because Scalia's "no-compromise
approach... often isolates him from his colleagues and prevents him from leading the
court's slowly maturing conservative majority,"'41 presidents should consider whether
subsequent nominees should be selected, as Ginsburg was, with an eye toward effective
participation in a collegial decision-making environment.
" Linda Greenhouse, A Sense of Judicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1993 AT Al, A 1l.
I See id.("In [Ginsburg's] view, equality -or any other goal -is best achieved if all branches of govemmenthave
a stake in achieving it. If courts move too fast, a legal victory may be fleeting and the F litical support necessary to
sustain it may not develop.").
139 Id.
, 0 Christopher E. Smith, Federal Judicial Salaries: A Critical Appraisal, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 849, 865-66 (1989).If
judicial officers are not insulated from and out of touch with the lives of their fellow citizens, they may "better...
comprehend and address the human problems which the judiciary confront." Id. at 866.
41 Kaplan & Cohn, supra note 68, at 62.
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Justice Ginsburg's performance on the Supreme Court will write the next chapter
in the evolving lesson book for presidents who must select new appointees to the high
court. Hopefully, as presidents study the pitfalls of predicting the future decisions of their
nominees, they will remember that history will ultimately judgeeachjustice- and each
appointing president - according to the impact of Supreme Court decisions on Ameri-
can society, not according to the justice's fulfillment of an appointing president's expec-
tations. If this larger lesson is learned and remembered, then presidents may diminish
their concerns for short-term political gains and focus greater attention on potential
nominees' judicial role conceptions and ability to work within a collegial decision-
making environment.
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